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Structure and Energy:
Toward a Civilization-Analytic
Perspective
Vytautas Kavolis

i

At a recent conference at the University of Southern California,
S. Marshall Cohen argued the need for a new theory of the
humanities. Modern scholars have been looking, he said, " a t individual subjects, such as politics, the law, or even works of art, as
separate, unconnected fields."
" I t is a feature of 'the modern' to distinguish these particular
spheres from one another...to discover what is distinctive in each of
them, and to focus theory and study on these distinctive features,"
he said.1 And he ended by calling for a "post-modern theory" of
the humanities to reestablish the lost connections.
Can civilization analysis provide the common ground for such
only in the humanities, but in the social sciences as well?
The comparative study of civilizations is facing uncertainties of
its own.
At a workshop on the teaching of comparative
civilizations held at the University of Chicago, it was pointed out
that "in the comparative study of civilizations, the search for a
theory not only in the humanities, but in the social sciences as well?
ject itself....[Yet] during the session no one put forth any comprehensive theory of how and why cultures can be compared." 2
One can go along with Milton Singer's doubts "whether comparative civilizations is a separate discipline." It is rather, he said,
a "framework for cross-cultural study of certain topics....Its function is to permit the comparison of cultures without making
premature claims for global correspondences.'"

This essay was presented as the Presidential Address at the 1978
Annual Meeting of the ISCSC(US) at the University of WisconsinMilwaukee.
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CORRECTION

The third and fourth paragraphs of page 21 should read as follows:
Can civilization analysis provide the common ground for such
theory not only in the humanities, but in the social sciences as well?
The comparative study of civilizations is facing uncertainties of
its own. At a workshop on the teaching of comparative civilizations
held at the University of Chicago, it was pointed out that "in the
comparative study of civilizations, the search for a theory of comparison and for certain rules of pertinence is the subject itself.... [Yet] during the session no one put forth any comprehensive
theory of how and why cultures can be compared." 2
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol1/iss1/10
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If the comparative study of civilizations is not a separate
discipline, does it, nevertheless, have a sense of issues more central
to it than to other kinds of cross-cultural studies, and a
methodology appropriate for considering such issues? Or is any
study in which evidence from two or more civilizations is used a
civilizational study?
II
The questions of Spengler. Weber, Toynbee, Sorokin, Kroeber
are not the only questions to which civilization analysts today address themselves. Perhaps, one is tempted to think, it is not by the
questions as such, but by the dimensions of analysis that the comparative study of civilizations should be defined. The reference to
"civilization" seems to imply two intellectual commitments: first,
to search for the largest comprehensible pattern of sociocultural
organization, which is what a civilization is, and not to rest content
until one has located one's current problem within this pattern.
Second, by referring 10 civilizations rather than societies or
cultures, a scholar gives signs of promising to pay attention to both
the symbolic systems and the social structures of which that largest
comprehensible unit of sociocultural organization, a civilization, is
composed.
One could even argue that the most profoundly civilizational approach would be directed to that which underlies both symbolic
systems and social structures. The traditional humanities are still
immersed mostly in studying individual works of culture and their
authors, taking it for granted that the human mind is as it works in
the tradition they are studying. The social sciences investigate the
collective organization of social activities and processes, usually
employing Western categories for analyzing them.
Boundary
disciplines, such as sociocultural history or sociology of culture,
reconstruct the connections between social structures and symbolic
systems.
Is there not something else, that which both symbolic systems
and social organizations presuppose, a series of changing comprehensions of the basic matrices of existence, that needs to be investigated with more analytical discipline than one finds in some of
the few pioneering works of this kind?
III
In search of that which underlies both social organization and
symbolic systems, the notion of civilizational designs might be of
service. Civilizational designs can be defined as symbolic con-
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figurations basic to a historic civilization seen as active forces in
their social contexts. Civilizational designs are the "generalized
texts" of which the particular texts of a cultural tradition—that
which is studied by the humanities—are partial expressions. The
particular works of culture fit the generalized texts to the
requirements of a genre or a symbolic technology and, especially in
modern times, also constitute individualized elaborations of, or offenses against, the generalized text. When viewed in its full particularity, the particular text is, in some degree, a distortion of the
generalized texts which make it possible.
But patterns of social activity and the organization of
society—studied by social scientists—also constitute partial expressions, or distortions, of civilizational designs. They are,
however, partial expressions of generalized texts by being their
situational adaptations, adjustments of civilizational designs (or of
their fragments, sometimes perhaps only of their vague memories)
to practical exigencies. Society is an incomplete symbolic design
and, at the same time, more than a symbolic design. But, up to a
point, it is possible and helpful to assume that the same fundamental symbolic designs are partially expressed both in the works of
culture and in the forms of social organization of a civilization,
however much these expressions differ from each other.
The civilizational mode of analysis is a method for uncovering,
or evoking, the generalized texts of particular civilizations. The
itineraries of these texts can be understood as the "depthsymbolic" levels of historical processes. The comparative study of
civilizational designs seeks to identify the configurations and the
itineraries of the major alternatives that history has provided for
organizing not only whole civilizations, but also the basic elements
which they must all contain to be civilizations.
What interests the civilization analyst above all are the
mythological paradigms in all thought, the dramatic designs in all
action, and the senses of adequation in all perception.
IV
Let me now raise a theoretical issue that emerges, in some way, in
the analysis of any civilizational phenomenon—the relations of
structure and energy, considered as alternative modes of coherence.
A mode of coherence may be viewed as the manner in which the
entities or qualities comprehended in a symbolic configuration are
sensed, or explicitly stated, to belong together.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol1/iss1/10
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Civilizational designs, of whatever scale, appear normally to incorporate, or imply, two contrasting, or interpenetrating, modes of
coherence: a "structural" or "architectonic" mode and a " f l u i d "
or "energetic" mode, " f o r m " and " f o r c e " (or "life"), 4 purusa
and prakrti in Hindu tradition, li and ch'i in Neo-Confucianism,
Limit and Unlimited Breath of the Pythagoreans, " l a w " and
" l o v e " in Christianity, "organization" and "spirit" in the sense of
Max Weber's study of the institutionalization of modern rational
capitalism. 5 It is the distinction, ultimately, between that which
stands and that which moves within a civilizational design. The
two modes are not necessarily seen as equal in strength.
Several questions immediately arise.
(1) If civilizational
phenomena normally contain a structure-energy distinguishability,
are the approaches which center their attention on "structures,"
even the "structures of consciousness," capable of grasping the full
meaning of any civilizational phenomenon and particularly of a
civilizational configuration as a whole? Is structuralism not intrinsically one-sided, inadequate to the "energetic" side of any
civilizational complex, to mysticism, emotion, sensibility?
(2) While questions may be raised whether structures exist in the
phenomena being observed or are imposed on them by the observer, it can, nevertheless, be assumed that whatever we call "structures" are, in principle, fully and correctly describable. But, in
studying what we conceive to exist within the "energetic" mode of
coherence, should the assumption not be made that "energies"
cannot, even in principle, be both fully and correctly described?
Unless they are misperceived as structures, energies can only be, in
the phenomenological sense, "interpreted"—at different times in
different ways, never definitively, as structures can be definitively
described.
(3) Do we therefore need different languages for coming to grips
with the structural and the energetic sides of civilizational
phenomena? The distinction between the structural and the
energetic seems to arise in both experiencing and in speaking about
experiences. The structural mode of experience can be conceived of
as a " p u r i t a n " boundedness to an order of entities with a totally
understandable manner of operation; the energetic mode of experience may be thought of as a "profligate" immersion in a
movement of forces or qualities, the meaning of which cannot be
completely understood or exhausted.
We might expect that to each mode of experience corresponds a
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mode of speaking appropriate to it. On this assumption we
postulate a distinction between an "exoteric" mode of speaking,
related to the structural mode of experience, consisting of a conceptually formulable discursive language through which truths
presumed to be demonstrable are precisely stated; and an
"esoteric" mode of speaking, related to the energetic mode of experience, consisting of evocative, or shocking, imagery through
which intuitions are imperfectly suggested. 6
The mode of speaking does not always correspond to the mode
of experience. The non-correspondence may be gainful, as when
an exoteric language produces a self-critical reserve toward the
energetic experiences described in it, a way of "testing" them
against a standard of judgment outside of themselves; or when an
esoteric language loosens the rigidity of structural experiences, insinuating new possibilities into them. But non-correspondences of
language and experience can also be sources of serious deformation
when exactitude in recording experiences is at issue. Perhaps any
language for speaking about human experiences which is too purely
esoteric or exoteric cannot, in the long run, avoid deforming experience more than needs to be the case.
The theoretical possibility of a reconciliation of esoteric and
exoteric languages is implicit in the notion of the metaphor as a
pointer " t o the existence of a given set of abstract relationships
hidden within some immediately graspable image.'" It is precisely
in civilization analysis—as distinguished from the comparative
studies of this or that—that such a reconciliation would seem appropriate.
V
Approaching the issue of the structure-energy differentiation in a
comparative civilizational perspective, we notice, first of all, certain gross differences in the way the fundamental relationship
between structure and energy is conceived. The structural and the
energetic may typically be correlated with each other in a harmonious relationship (as in Confucian China), or arranged in a
sequence of alternating temporary domination (as tends to be the
case in Hindu mythology), or locked into a hierarchic relationship
of control (as in medieval and early modern Europe), or conceived
as engaged in a battle until one's destruction by the other (as in
Marxist revolutionary theory), or the energetic can be seen as so
oppressively contained by an unmodifiable and unremovable structure that only total escape from structure can satisfy (as in
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Gnosticism), or the structural may be regarded as the unreal form
of the less unreal energetic (as in Buddhism).
Much of the character of the structure-energy relationship can be
revealed through inquiries into the symbolic categories with which
the structure-energy differentiation is associated in particular
traditions. Wolfgang Bauer has pointed out that, contrary to a
prominent Western tendency, in China the structural term li is
associated with the " i n n e r , " the energetic term ch'i with the
"outer."* Instead of energy being contained by structure, as the
Western romantic tradition, at least, tends to assume, in China
structure is surrounded by energy.
Moreover, Bauer goes on to suggest, the categories "spontaneity, life" belong, together with the structural li, to the " i n n e r , "
whereas "order, law" are classified, together with the energetic
ch'i, under the " o u t e r . " Can we infer from these categorical
correlations that, in the Confucian tradition, "structure" is
natural, that which one spontaneously adheres to (and of the
adherence to which spontaneity consists), but that, conversely,
"energies" are what one is, less naturally, compelled by (as one is
compelled not only by artificial law, but also by fits of human
passion, which the Confucians have tended to view as originating
outside of the normal psychosomatic organization of the individual,
as sickness or as an externally generated magic, somewhat in the
manner of Tristan's love potion, thus either " a b n o r m a l " or "artificial")? In this Chinese view, structure is natural and " g o o d , "
but energy can be either natural (and " g o o d " ) , if coordinated with
structure, or artificial (and " b a d " ) , if not so coordinated.
The symbolic associations of the structure-energy differentiation reach into all areas of metaphysical, social, or psychological
organization. One problem area may be mentioned here. Taoist,
Tantric and Western mystical, Romantic, and revolutionary
evidence suggests a cross-civilizational tendency to associate structure and energy, on the one hand, with masculinity and femininity
and, on the other hand, with some form of the "right-wing," "leftwing" differentiation. The categories of masculinity-femininity,
however, do not appear to be closely linked with the right-left differentiation, but tend to be conventionally correlated with the
rationality-emotionality distinction. In the historic civilizations,
"rationally disciplined" action, not only the military and the
priestly, has been assigned mainly to men, whereas "spon-
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taneous," "whole-hearted," and passionate activities have
engaged, more equally, both men and women. 9
Are masculine and feminine identities (or masculine and
feminine components of identities) resonant, on some deep level of
culture construction, to the comprehensions of structure and
energy on the one hand, and to the imaginations of rationality and
emotionality on the other hand, and change as these two sets of
categories do? Or are these correlations variables? Do all types of
structure and energy, rationality and emotionality relate to
masculinity-femininity in the same way? Such questions seem
capable of generating more knowledge of the symbolic grounding
of masculinity and femininity than Sherry Ortner s initially
provocative, but not affirmatively answerable question: " I s
Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?".' 0

VI
We might describe each conception of energy in its uniqueness
and in particular the language in which it has been formulated by its
authors. But we might also construct, as a scaffolding for comparative study, a general typology of basic alternative comprehensions of energy, stated in a cosmopolitan language. Let me suggest
a very tentative, not necessarily complete and, no doubt, primitive
typology.
Energy has been comprehended, or sensed, as: (1) life-sustaining
or "vital" (proliferating fecundity; the fearful instinct of selfpreservation, as in Hobbes; a harmonious unfolding of inherent
potentialities, as in Goethe), (2) pattern-destroying or "demonic"
(thanatos, madness, Durkheim's unlimited, Faustian aspirations),
(3) primordial or "dionysian" (a hurricane, revolution in the
modern sense, Max Weber's "charisma" at its inception: an outbreak that can be either destructive or revitalizing or both at the
same time), (4) civilizing or "apollonian" (the drive to build and
adhere to symbolic designs, social systems, or rules of "good
behavior"), (5) agonistic (the urge for honor, illustriousness,
historic or cosmic recognition to be acquired by great deeds in a
contest), (6) ethereal (the energy of "moral-aesthetic sensitivity,"
of responsiveness to suffering or to beauty, arising unpredictably,
and with memorable poignancy, within particular acts or experiences; or that of ch'i-yun, "spirit-consonance," through which the
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cultivated painters of traditional China sought intuitive communion with the spiritual qualities immanent in all nature)," (7)
transcendentalizing (a pressure to transcend the world, to recall
others or to return to the "spiritual home"), (8) animistic (a
plurality of free-floating, durable bundles of energy, each
animating only itself and the phenomena it "chooses" or is "forced"
to enter), and (9) mechanical (the force of predictable attraction or repulsion due to proximity or composition, as in magnetism
or associational psychology).
Each type is viewed here as an image subsuming a range of
processes and a set of diverse but partly overlapping theories interpreting these processes. The treatment of energy in particular
schools of thought or currents of sensibility may compound several
of the analytic types or present the characteristics of one type under the disguise of another. Thus there is much demonic energy
under the dionysian appearance of Nietzsche, whereas Blake has
clearly distinguished demonic reason from dionysian eros. In the
Romantic movement, the energy of Prometheus, which seems to
have synthesized civilizing and ethereal elements on a primordial
base, has tended to be misperceived as demonic (conflation of
Prometheus with Satan).
But while agonistic energies were
prominently elaborated in Greece (typically in conjunction with the
civilizing ones), the demonic were not.
The "unconscious" has been viewed as belonging to the
analytical realm of "undivided unity" beyond or within the structure-energy differentiation.' 2 "Consciousness," in traditions of
rational contemplation, may be conceived as the instrumentality
for gaining access to undivided unity; or, in traditions of affective
mysticism, it may itself be the chief barrier separating from undivided unity. However, once a rigorous distinction has been made
in psychological theory between the "conscious" and the "unconscious," the former tends to be comprehended as structural, the
latter as energetic. But through which of the nine fundamental
images of energy or their compounds is the unconscious, in particular instances, comprehended? Through which images are the
dynamics of sexuality (or of power) perceived? Which types of
energy are engaged in the various kinds of " p l a y , " and which
referred to in the ideologies glorifying " p l a y " as the "sphere of
humanization"?
Each civilization or major tradition within it has its own durable
but not unchanging symbolic designs for comprehending energy.
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Clifford Geertz's interpretations in Islam Observed suggest that the
energy most distinctive of Indonesian Islam can be identified as
ethereal-transcendentalizing (in a style prominent also in Japan), of
Moroccan Islam as agonistic-transcendentalizing. 13
The prevailing comprehension of energy in historic China ap
proximates the life-sustaining type. For the Confucians, but not
for the Taoists, it is continuous with civilizing energy. Ethereal
energies—more important than in the classical civilizations of
Europe, the Near East, India—have an allocated place in poetry,
amateur painting, and the cultivation of friendship (largely reserved
to men of the educated class). Popular religiosity, as everywhere
else in predominantly agricultural civilizations, is full of animistic
energies, not recognized in the dominant traditions of sophisticated
thought (as similar conceptions were recognized in Europe). Buddhism has introduced the notion of pure transcendentalizing
energy, but it has remained peripheral to the mainstream of
Chinese tradition. There is also, in Chinese popular mythology, a
category of beings, such as the White Snake Lady or the Monkey in
The Journey to the West, who represent primordial energies in
animal form, evolving, through their own potentialities for compassion and self-sacrifice, either into life-sustaining energy in
human form or " t o the highest spiritual attainment possible." 14
Primordial energy is thus capable of transforming itself into transcendentalizing energy: the Chinese conception of "moral
evolution."
In India, the basic tendency has been to view energy, 'sakti, as
primordial." In Indian mythology, life-sustaining and destructive
energies are distinguished, but they are regarded not as permanently separated, as in the medieval and early modern West, but as
aspects of the same processes flowing into each other in an
oscillating pattern16 (a pattern that is formally similar to the conception of the alternation between conscious and unconscious mental
and
nineteenth-century
European
states
in
eighteenthpsychology). 17 In contrast to the either-or structure of JudeoChristian mythological paradigms,in Hindu mythology, as Wendy
Doniger O'Flaherty has observed, a demon can go " f r o m demonic,
to virtuous, to demonic, and finally to virtuous again." 1 8 In Indian
literature of spiritual guidance, energy becomes either transcendentalizing (through contemplation or bhakti devotion) or polluting.
And in the bhakti tradition it becomes available to potentially
everyone.
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How are the diverse comprehensions of energy distributed
through the social organization of a civilization and how does this
distribution change over time? In what patterns of meaning are
these comprehensions fitted together within the design of the
civilizations to which they belong? Do different configurations of
the meanings of energy influence the direction in which the various
spheres of practical life (politics, therapy, scientific theorizing)
develop?
VII
A civilization is likely to contain several major alternative comprehensions of energy, and relationships not only between structure
and energy, but also between the different types of energy, become
problematic. Some types of structures seem to have the function of
separating or of connecting different kinds of energy. The Hindu
caste system is a structure that separates the transcendentalizing
energy of " p u r i t y " and the destructive, or at least infectious,
energies of "pollution." In the West, it is not the "stratification
system," but the programs of the witch hunters and political extremists that operate in a similar manner.
In the Catholic tradition of medieval Europe, the commanding
structure of the law was in a sense interposed between two types of
energy: the ultimately transcendentalizing energy of " l o v e , "
caritas, superior to the law, and the ultimately destructive energy of
" l u s t , " cupiditas, inferior to the law. Love and lust were conceived
as mutually exclusive, but only lust, like the uneducated in Confucian China, was subjectable to control by the structure of the
law.
In a late-Renaissance modality, all energies became subject to
structural control.
Prospero, in The Tempest, keeps both
" n a t u r e , " the primordial energy of Caliban, and "spirit," the
ethereal energy of Ariel, contained, for a short moment, within the
magically supported structure of an artificial civilization, an
ephemeral design of institutionalized humanism.
To what extent is Shakespeare articulating a change in the fundamental frames of experience and expression, in that which is
generally presupposed in arranging particular experiences and expressions, and to what extent is he merely expressing, however
compellingly, his own vision (and critique)? How does one identify
a fundamental design in a civilization which, no longer a com-
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paratively unitary symbolic organization sustaining a limited
variety of interrelated texts and performances, is becoming an
unlimited variety of autonomous texts and performances projected
by a limited multiplicity of mutually evocative modes of discourse?
The latter description applies not so much to Shakespeare as to
the "post-modern" civilization now presumably forming. In this
case, the methodological problem becomes crucial: How are the
generalized texts, and their resonances of mutual evocation, to be
inferred from either a single text produced by an individual author
or a whole set of such texts? One approach to this question is to
begin, in studying them, with analytical elements which all texts,
particular and generalized, can be presumed to engage.

VIII
Like energy, structure can be conceptualized in a variety of ways.
While structure might be regarded simply as the pattern of interaction among elements constituting, permanently or momentarily, a
system, it will be viewed here as differentiated by its presumed
relationship to energy. Confusion is bound to arise if structure is
analyzed as if this relationship did not matter or if one kind of
structure-energy relationship is implicitly assumed, in the very con
ception of structure, as a universal constant.
The comparative-historical record suggests that four comprehensions of structure constitute the major alternatives:
(1) Structure can be conceived of as a stabilizing and directive
container of energies preserved therein, a container that may
become an "iron cage" or "prison house" for the energies within it
or may even be left devoid of energies, an "empty shell," a
mechanism ticking by its own inertia." (2) Structure can be comprehended as a mediatorial device, a "language" for transmitting
"messages" of energies to each other, a stable, but not necessarily
distortion-free, system of signals for energies too mysterious, too
protean, too dangerous or too dumb to communicate with each
other without such mediation. (3) Structure can be seen as the
perennial core of the flow of energies, the stable " a x i s " of
energetic activity. (4) Structure can be regarded as a momentary
confluence of interacting energies of one type or of several types, a
cross-sectional "slice" of a conjunction of processes. 20
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We might call these the containing, mediatorial, axial, and confluential (or perhaps Gnostic-Imperial, Dramaturgic, Confucian,
and Buddhist-Probabilist, comprehensions of structure. In the first
two types, which have been especially prominent in Western
traditions, structure is comprehended as extrinsic to energy. In the
latter two types, historically more salient in the Asian
civilizations—but also in Husserl and in contemporary
sociology—structure is intrinsic to energy. (The Hindu tradition
employs containing structures on the "social" level, to protect the
purity of the higher castes from contamination, and axial structures
on the "metaphysical" level, in conceiving of the general relationship between active energetic nature, prakt^i, and passive structural
spirit, purusa). The first two, but not the latter two, comprehensions of structure imply a need to deal with energies by artificial
means, such as the mask that became, in Latin, the etymological
foundation of the Western category of the " p e r s o n , " the type case
of mediatorial structure. In Chinese, the " p e r s o n , " j$n, which
stands for "human-heartedness" as well, has originated not, as in
the West, as an artificial structure, but as a natural energy, as spontaneous "kindness of the ruler." 2 1
In contemporary sociology, Talcott Parsons represents the axial
conception of social structure, with value orientations providing
the axis, a different one for each society. The mathematical
sociologists (but also, on an entirely different level of historicalanalytic sophistication, Max Weber) tend toward a confluential
conception of social structure. (In Weber, the mediatorial and containing conceptions of structure are, of course, also present.) Erving Goffman's image of what he finds interesting in social structure is mediatorial—with human energies reduced entirely to the
capacity to stage illusory performances, of which Goffman's perception of civilization apparently consists. (His dramaturgical
sociology therefore has little drama in it.) Durkheim has favored a
containing conception of social structure (having defined the social
fact by the characteristics of exteriority to and constraint upon the
individual's subjectivity); and this would tend to be the case both
with orthodox Marxists and law-and-order conservatives. An
adequately developed sociological theory can hardly rely upon a
single comprehension even of social structure. Nor can it ignore
the social comprehensions of cosmic, natural, and psychic structures.
Structures can also be differentiated by their presumed origins,
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from which varying attitudes toward their obligatoriness arise, into: the ordained, as by the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God; the
naturally grown, evolved spontaneously either through "material"
interactions, as in evolutionary theory, or through "spiritual"
congenialities, as in Confucian-Taoist China; and the artificially
established, as in Hobbes (or in the Chinese Legalist conception of
the law). An ordained structure can be comprehended as either (a)
"permanent lawfulness" (Judeo-Christian, though not Puritan):
once commanded to arise, it exists for ever and, in extreme cases, is
binding even upon its creator, or (b) "instantaneous lawfulness"
(Islamic): established by God's will at each moment, binding upon
the creation alone, capable of being changed by God in the
twinkling of the eye.22
In a critical evaluation of sociocultural structures regarded as artificial or even as naturally grown (i.e., traditional), the question
arises: what is optional and what is "objectively necessary" in them?
From this point of view, arbitrary structures, which can be
produced or eliminated at will (structure as comprehended in
ethnomethodology), can be distinguished from grounded structures, the details of which, created by men and women, are placed
within fundamental "givens," whether static or dynamic, that cannot be disregarded without punishment or failure. This is the basic
conception of social structure in traditional China, in classical,
medieval and, on the common sense level, still in continental
Europe and, officially and more rigidly, in the Soviet Union. In
contrast, Hindu caste structures are ordained (as was whatever
Stalin decided during his dictatorship). Conversely, the AngloSaxon (and, generally, liberal) tendency, since the seventeenth century, has been increasingly to treat social structure—with the exception of its legal-constitutional foundation—as wholly constructed,
at least until the recent wave of "ecological consciousness."
Various kinds of structures can be presumed to exist in the same
sociohistorical setting, and relationships among different types of
structures are as problematic as relationships among diverse
energies. Difficulties are compounded when the same "empirical"
evidence can be interpreted, by different observers and participants,
as arranged into fundamentally different types of structures.
Through which image of structure, for example, is a "structure of
consciousness" comprehended? Can one type of structure be comprehended by a mind committed to a way of comprehending structures alien to the structure being comprehended? Or must a struc-
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tural analyst have a "multi-structural" mind and something
beyond all its structures, a daemon perhaps, a sense of adequation
at the core of his personality, to warn him or her when not to use a
particular comprehension of structure (and indeed when to stop
comprehending altogether)?
In some cases, one man's structure can be another man's (or
woman's) energy. (Is it then equally valid to study it as structure or
as energy?) Civilization itself—and its central component, the
history of consciousness (and of sensibility)—can be comprehended
either structurally or energetically, "seriously" (in the mode of
adherence to structures) or "spiritedly" (in the mode of adherence
to energies). Moreover, closer inspection reveals structures within
energies and energies within structures, in addition to the
predominantly structural standpoint of the analyst, and the
prevailing energetic moment of immersion of the interpreter.
In
Freud (and indeed in most of the major figures of the Western intellectual tradition, to a greater extent than among most nonWestern thinkers), the analyst and the interpreter coincide.
IX
The structural-energetic approach provides a basis for the comparative analysis of psychological and sociological theories and of
their sources in the taken-for-granted presuppositions of the
cultural tradition, or traditions, in which they have been generated.
The structure-energy methodology, unfolded in its full comparative civilizational dimensions, should also help us identify what
is missing, with serious consequences, in particular theories.
In George Herbert Mead's conception of the self, me is a structural, / an energetic component. 25 A mediatorial structure is
associated with culture, a life-sustaining energy with nature, in a
manner unlike that in which the structure-energy differentiation
has been linked with the nature-culture continuum in Confucianism. But the relationship between / and me is one of almost
Confucian-like harmoniousness.
Mead, however, distrusts neither structure nor energy. They are
both " g o o d , " in contrast to the Confucian tendency to perceive
energy as a possible source of corruption (a possibility the more
conservative Confucians were more apt to perceive). If / were to
have been conceived as primordial energy and me as a containing
structure, instead of the peaceful dialogue, Mead would have to
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expect a potential explosive battle. But that would no longer be an
American social psychology: in this tradition of thought, the
energies of nature tend to appear as the energies of a garden, not of
wildness.
In the Freudian theory of the personality, we find a more complicated design. Primordial energy (the id), associated with nature,
later partitioned into the two, mutually antagonistic energies of
eros and thanatos, confronts two structures, both associated, but in
different ways, with culture—the communicative structure of the
ego and the commanding structure of the superego,
the
"bourgeois" and "monarchic" components of the personality. 24
Structure is associated by Freud, on the one hand, with the
sphere of culture and, on the other hand, with the intrapsychic equivalents of imperial authority and of middle-class rationality. Energy
is associated, on the one hand, with the sphere of nature and, on
the other hand, with the intrapsychic equivalent of the proletariat
(or the savage, or the "eternal barbarian"). The equations in this
system of classification suggest that culture lacks energy of its own,
but so does the ruling class, which can only exploit lower-class
energies and rigidly command until its authority is collectivized (in
an authoritarian "collective superego"), and the middle class,
which can only transform lower class energies into its rationalizing
structures. Where Id was shall Ego be. Like Plato, Freud seems to
get some elements of his theory, in the Durkheimian manner, from
his perception of social stratification. 25 This implies that the conception of the nature-culture relationship in psychoanalytic theory
might change radically with a transformation of class relations in
society (or of their perception by the theorist), since a natureculture theory and a theory of social stratification are so intimately
intertwined in Freud's theory of the personality.
In contrast to the Confucian and to Mead, not one of the
possible relationships among the components of the personality
defined by Freud is presumed to be spontaneously cooperative. It
is the pressure of a self-contained, Jehovah-like commanding structure in the personality and of conflictual relationships between the
two types of energy that constitute the peculiarly Western (GrecoHebrew) elements in Freud's theory, elements that would most
likely have to be modified in an Indian, Chinese or Japanese adaptation of psychoanalysis.
But these elements represent medieval conceptions of structure
and energy, to which Freud has added the eighteenth-century com-
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ponent of the ego. the psychological counterpart of the social class
of playwrights, scientists and journalists, the carrier of Enlightenment in the modern European sense. What is /KW/-Enlightenment
in Freud is the ambivalence toward all structures and energies, an
altitude somewhat reminiscent of the more ancient layers of Hindu
mythology.
What is the civilizational significance of the decline of the tripartite, social-class oriented frame of consciousness which Georges
Dumezil has found to be characteristic of Indo-European
mythology and which is still employed by Freud but discarded by
Mead and other American social psychologists? Is it a result of the
more fluid American society in which classes are no longer firm
enough to provide symbolic frames for thought in general, and
therefore only the contrasts of nature and culture and of structure
and energy remain for draping psychological theories on?
X
In contemporary sociology the conception of energy, quite in
contrast to the conception of structure (and in spite of Marx,
Durkheim, and Weber), tends to be shadowy. 26 This may help explain the attractiveness of psychoanalytic theory, which has a
strong conception of energy, to social scientists. But even when the
Freudian notion of energy is drawn upon by social scientists such
as Talcott Parsons, it is impoverished by the explicit or implicit
denial of either primordial or destructive energy as independent
types. (Primordial energy reemerges, somewhat marginally, in the
"strain-stress model": the assumption that a type of energy that
can be either destructive or creative is generated by "deprivations"
or "deformations" imposed on life-sustaining energies, which are
treated as primary and " n o r m a l . " The theory suggests a contemporary "trivialization of the primordial.")
Most types of energy that civilizationists may be able to identify
have no standing in social science theory.
Most types of energy that civilizationists may be able to identify
have no standing in social science theory. What is left is either
mechanical energy of impersonal attraction and repulsion, as in
studies of group dynamics, or life-sustaining energy, frequently interpreted, in human beings, as rationally calculating rather than
spontaneously impulsive. The tendency to seek a unitary conception of energy can only diminish the power of the social scien-
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ces—as well as of psychology—to
give justice to the symbolic
organization of experience.27
A further tendency may be noted. Energy seems to be relegated
by Parsons, in his latest work, to lower levels of
- "cybernetic
control hierarchy"—which is where the medievals would have
placed the energy of lust (but not the energy of love).28 Such treatment of energy helps explain the generally "de-energized" character of Parsonian sociology. This limitation might have been
avoided by conceiving, in addition to the structural-control hierarchy, as Parsons does, also an energetic-control hierarchy, independent of the first and operating in the opposite direction, with, for
example, the passions in dominating position. The two hierarchies
could then be seen not as parts of a consolidated circle of control,
but as bargaining with each other for shares in determining outcomes, with several hierarchies of each type participating in the
process and their potencies varying over time. This, however,
would be a polytheistic rather than Parsonian sociology, Weberian
rather than Confucian, an approximation to what James Hillman
has done to Jungian analysis. 29
XI
Can a central aspect of civilization analysis be conceived of as
a systematic comparison of the comprehensions of energy and of
structure and of relations between them in particular civilizations
and in major traditions within them, and of changes over time in
these comprehensions and relations?
Do particular circumstances of life produce dispositions to favor
particular comprehensions of energy and structure? In what social
settings, through what historical processes do the experiences of
particular types of energy and structure become especially
vivid—gratifying or frightening? In what settings and through
what processes do such experiences dissolve or become exhausted
("dissipation of energies, dissolution of structures")?
Where are the points of tension within a civilizational design
between different comprehensions of structure? How do particular
kinds of energies come to press violently against established structures of one or another type? How do whole configurations of
such comprehensions of structures and energies become established
and how do they handle their internal tensions?
Will approaches of this kind help us to understand what a

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol1/iss1/10

18

Kavolls: Structure and Energy: Toward a Civilization-Analytic perspective
38
civilization encompasses (or accentuates), in its various settings,
within its symbolic designs, and what it excludes (or suppresses);
and to discern what the originality of a creative individual, when
set against the pattern of his civilization (or civilizations), consists
of?
Does the structure-energy mode of analysis help specify what
basic issues are engaged in the social and intellectual struggles of
particular periods, in the "crises of consciousness, identity and
authority," as Benjamin Nelson has called them, and to explain the
choices of policy?
XII
An approach to the depth-symbolic level of historical processes
that does its work on this level of generality will have to cut across
the established disciplines. It may thus provide a way to reorganize
their accumulations of evidence and interpretation around analytic
concerns shared by all of them. Approaches of this kind may contribute a range of usable metasymbolic frames and flow tracings
for a new grounding of the distinctive theories of the humanities
and the social sciences: a common ground not only historical and
analytic, but also cross-disciplinary and comparative-civilizational.
Efforts along these lines should also move us a little closer to
what I take to be our shared educational goal of creating a
multicivilizational universe of discourse in which problems could
be formulated both from Western and from non-Western perspectives and comparisons of Western with Chinese or Indian or
Islamic or African modes of thought would come, to an educated
individual, as easily as references to Plato, Shakespeare, Weber, or
the great reductionists, Marx and Freud.
Dickinson
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